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Grounded Theory and Pragmatism: 
The Curious Case of Anselm Strauss
Antony Bryant
Abstract: Sir Arthur CONAN DOYLE's stories featuring Sherlock Holmes are justly famous the 
world over. In The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes (1993) one story entitled Silver Blaze contains an 
exchange between Holmes and a Scotland Yard detective as follows:
.....Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): "Is there any other point to which 
..........you would wish to draw my attention?" 
.....Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time." 
.....Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time." 
.....Holmes: "That was the curious incident." 
In similar fashion I wish to draw attention to the curious case of Anselm STRAUSS: There is already 
a good deal of work pointing to the continuities between the Grounded Theory Method (GTM) and 
the Pragmatism of John DEWEY and Charles PEIRCE. This has usually focused on Anselm 
STRAUSS with his Chicago-influenced Pragmatist background, although STRAUSS himself never 
articulated the way in which Pragmatism informed or could be brought to bear on the method as it 
evolved from the 1960s onwards.
This paper argues that many of the contentious issues surrounding GTM can be resolved if they are 
understood against the context of some of the core tenets of Pragmatism, particularly the ways in 
which some of the more recent Pragmatists such as Richard RORTY have brought them back as a 
focus of attention. In so doing is raises the question of why, given his intellectual background and 
formation, Anselm STRAUSS did so little to bring Pragmatist ideas into GTM in its later 
embodiments and extended statements. That is the "curious incident" to which specific attention is 
drawn at several points in what follows; it remains a perplexing one, with perhaps no convincing 
solution, unlike the Sherlock Holmes mystery alluded to above. 
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1. Issues and Aspects of Grounded Theory
1.1 The emergence and growth of GTM
It is widely acknowledged that one of the strengths of the early statements of the 
Grounded Theory Method (hereafter GTM—short for Grounded Theory Method) 
was the diverse backgrounds of the two originators—Anselm STRAUSS and 
Barney GLASER. This has usually been characterised in the following manner: 
STRAUSS hailed from the Chicago School of sociology, with its stress on 
qualitative, ethnographic research; GLASER from the more quantitative 
orientation associated with Columbia, New York. The outcome was a method, 
aimed initially at qualitative studies, which sought to offer researchers a rigorous 
basis for producing and justifying genuine conceptual insights. As such 
STRAUSS' progenitors are usually listed as MEAD (1934), PARK (1952) and 
BLUMER (1969); GLASER's as LAZARSFELD (LAZARSFELD & ROSENBERG, 
1955) and MERTON (1949). [1]
Yet there are problems in simply stating these biographical facts as if they were 
self-evidently explanatory of some of the key features and developments of the 
method itself. It must be stressed that the early statements of the method were 
never presented as some amalgam of the intellectual and methodological 
antecedents of GLASER and STRAUSS. On the contrary, the entire project was 
one of innovation, and a break with existing traditions and practices. As Jörg 
STRÜBING pointed out in comments on an early draft of this paper, The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory (GLASER & STRAUSS, 1967) [hereafter 
Discovery] was first and foremost a manifesto, seeking to present a genuine 
alternative to the dominant quantitative agenda of the time. As such it did not 
provide much by way of an historical account of the two progenitors. STRAUSS 
makes this very clear in his 1994 interview in which he recalls that one of the key 
motivations behind Discovery was the authors' desire to encourage young 
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researchers to break away from the influence of Parsonian functionalism 
(LEGEWIE & SCHERVIER-LEGEWIE, 1994). [2]
This does not explain, however, why the subsequent development of GTM in its 
first three decades is notable for the almost complete absence of any extended 
acknowledgement to either of the two traditions from which GLASER and 
STRAUSS had emerged. As has been argued elsewhere (BRYANT & 
CHARMAZ, in press) this is one of the paradoxes in the development of GTM, 
and might partly be explained by the initial need of GLASER and STRAUSS to 
stress the novelty of the method; then latterly by the divergence between the two 
founders, with each keen to characterise their specific orientation. [3]
GLASER's intellectual formation prior to his collaboration with STRAUSS was 
speedy, focused and short; yet highly important in the light of the development of 
GTM. He had studied as an undergraduate at Stanford, and continued his studies 
in France while serving in the military. In the late 1950s he enrolled as a doctoral 
student at Columbia, where Paul LAZARSFELD was the presiding influence. 
LAZARSFELD's work was notable for many reasons and in several fields; not 
only sociology, but also public opinion research and mass communication 
studies. Although sometimes regarded as primarily a quantitative researcher it is 
probably far more accurate to regard LAZARSFELD's work as an extended and 
concerted effort to take account of both quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches; using the strengths of each to complement the other, and also 
pointing out the weaknesses of each. [4]
Initially, but only briefly, GLASER's mentor was R.K. MERTON; as GLASER 
recalled at one of his seminars, "I was a doctoral student, doing research on 
sociology of science ... for about one afternoon" (London GTM Seminar, 2006). 
His specific doctoral research took off in an entirely different direction, almost as 
if impelled by a motivation to react against the sort of sociological theorising that 
MERTON represented. The influence of LAZARSFELD, however, was more far 
reaching, and to some extent GLASER might be considered as one of the key 
adherents and developers of LAZARSFELD's methodological ideas. GLASER 
himself makes this clear in his recent book on Quantitative GT (2008) where he 
clarifies the ways in which LAZARSFELD's ideas influenced and presaged many 
key aspects of GTM itself. [5]
Having completed his PhD in 1961, GLASER teamed up with STRAUSS, and 
Jeanne QUINT, and from that time on has been indelibly bound up with GTM. 
Some have wondered why STRAUSS did not work with people from Chicago, or 
others associated with the Chicago school. Although he does not mention the 
circumstances in which they met, STRAUSS does note that he was enormously 
impressed with Barney GLASER and so took him on as an associate without 
even requesting letters of recommendation (LEGEWIE & SCHERVIER-LEGEWIE 
1994). In particular he pointed out that what he had been doing intuitively, 
GLASER was also doing, but in a more systematic manner that drew on 
LAZARSFELD's ideas. [6]
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At the start of their collaboration STRAUSS had a far longer, deeper and more 
profound relationship with his intellectual background. He was already an 
established academic and researcher before teaming up with GLASER in the 
1960s, and even after the appearance of the three founding texts of GTM 
(GLASER & STRAUSS, 1965, 1967, 1968), he continued to work in areas other 
than those related to GTM. Moreover he also undertook teaching engagements in 
Germany where his influence remains strong, and extends beyond his GTM 
writings; encompassing his wider methodological work as well as his specifically 
interactionist studies, and other research into medical practices and medical 
sociology (STRAUSS, 1959, 1982a, 1982b, 1984; STRAUSS, FAGERHAUGH, 
SUCZEK & WIENER, 1985), all informed by his interest in sociology of work and 
organisation. In the 1994 interview, STRAUSS mentions the influence of many 
specific figures in his intellectual formation, including PARK, HUGHES, and 
BLUMER; in the introduction to Qualitative Analysis (STRAUSS, 1987), he refers 
to the "general thrust of American Pragmatism" (p.5), particularly DEWEY, but 
also PEIRCE and MEAD. [7]
So whereas GLASER's overall theoretical context and range of publications are 
devoted almost entirely to GTM, STRAUSS was always far more diverse, and his 
range of publications encompasses a far wider remit than GTM. Many of these 
are highly regarded, particularly in the German-speaking world. Thus Mirrors and 
Masks (STRAUSS, 1959), which appeared in the US around the same time as 
GOFFMAN's The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), is far more widely 
known in Germany than is GOFFMAN's work; the opposite of what is found in the 
US and UK. Similarly Continual Permutations of Action (hereafter Continual), 
STRAUSS' final published book (STRAUSS, 1993), is highly regarded in 
Germany, but merits few references or citations elsewhere. [8]
1.2 Two views of "basic" GTM
STRAUSS and GLASER later fell out with regard to GTM, particularly in 1992 
when STRAUSS, together with Julie CORBIN, published Basics of Qualitative 
Research (1990) (hereafter BQR)1. GLASER saw BQR, with some justification, 
as undermining the method, although STRAUSS and CORBIN clearly felt that 
there was an unmet demand for something akin to a GT methods manual; which 
reinforces the point made earlier about the early GTM texts themselves. In the 
1994 interview (LEGEWIE & SCHERVIER-LEGEWIE, 2004) STRAUSS recounts 
how both BQR and the earlier Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists 
(STRAUSS, 1987) (hereafter QA) came about. QA was based on recorded 
transcripts made by students who attended STRAUSS' workshops. The book 
itself, therefore, derived from work with students already partially versed in some 
aspects of GTM. The later book, BQR, written jointly with Juliet CORBIN, was 
explicitly aimed at students starting out on their research, with perhaps little or no 
idea about qualitative research as such, and certainly no knowledge of GTM. [9]
1 A second edition appeared in 1998, and a third edition in 2008 (CORBIN & STRAUSS, 2008).
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Some people have wondered why GLASER's wrath was targeted at BQR and not 
at QA, as there are clear continuities between the two books. QA makes specific 
reference to GLASER's work, and STRAUSS clearly saw no problem in linking 
QA to a generic approach—not a single method—that encompassed their early 
joint work and their later separate writings: Indeed in his introduction STRAUSS 
extols GLASER's book Theoretical Sensitivity (GLASER, 1978), and 
acknowledges GLASER's permission to quote extensively from it. (This had 
consequences for the reception and dissemination of GTM particularly in 
Germany as STRAUSS did not use direct quotes and so readers were unable to 
distinguish between his words and GLASER's.) STRAUSS stressed that the 
second half of Chapter 1 "is essentially his [GLASER's] except for some 
amplification" (1987, p.xiv). No doubt, whereas STRAUSS probably saw no great 
distinction between QA and BQR, GLASER saw a complete break with the 
approach that had been developed from Discovery. As a response, GLASER 
produced his own book on the basics of GTM; Basics of Grounded Theory 
Analysis (BGTA) (GLASER, 1992). This was specifically not a book to explain the 
basics of the method to a novice, but more to reclaim them from what GLASER 
perceived as their misappropriation. [10]
There is a double irony here. First, although BQR was indeed an imperfect and 
potentially misleading statement of GTM (see below), it was undoubtedly highly 
influential in widening the appeal and claimed use of the method itself. Second, 
given STRAUSS' background in the sociological orientation of the Chicago 
School (often thought of as solely symbolic interaction, but which also 
encompassed aspects of Pragmatism), it is surprising that he never drew on this 
in any concerted manner in his GTM writings; least of all in BQR which can be all 
too easily read as a somewhat mechanistic GTM cook-book with little or no 
reference to the role of the researcher as an active participant in the research 
context itself. [11]
GLASER's critique was targeted at the way in which STRAUSS and CORBIN 
removed or effaced what he saw as the key features of GTM, particularly those 
which GLASER himself had contributed to the method. (See the chapter in BGTA 
on "Intellectual Property", particularly the section headed "Glaser's Intellectual 
Input".) In QA STRAUSS makes specific reference to the twin traditions 
embodied by the two authors of Discovery, and this is also mentioned in the first 
two editions of BQR. So in a sense GLASER was justified in arguing that these 
two strands were being unravelled in what he saw as a potentially misleading 
fashion that threatened to undermine the innovative characteristics of GTM; 
hence GLASER's vociferous defence of what he calls Classic Grounded Theory. 
What is surprising, however, is the tone of BQR itself, given STRAUSS' 
background and his specific reference to the influence of American Pragmatism 
in QA. Although there are some aspects of the book which lend themselves to a 
more sophisticated reading, the general tone is at best philosophically naïve, with 
largely unexamined positivist or realist assumptions. Anyone disputing this needs 
to look carefully at the sections dealing with data, theorising and the like. [12]
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1.3 "An epistemological fairytale"
One of the responses to the ways in which GTM developed post-BQR was the 
articulation of a constructivist form of the method. This sought to resolve the 
"epistemological fairy tale" that lay, often unacknowledged, at the heart of GTM 
whether of the GLASER or STRAUSS/CORBIN variety. STRÜBING (2007) and 
others well versed in the GTM literature, particularly the writings of STRAUSS, 
have bridled at the ways in which the distinct strands of the two progenitors of the 
method have often been lumped together by those writing from a constructivist 
position. STRÜBING in particular, with his extensive knowledge of the Pragmatist 
literature, as well as his command of STRAUSS' work, criticises those such as 
Kathy CHARMAZ and me (BRYANT, 2002; CHARMAZ, 2000a; BRYANT & 
CHARMAZ, 2007a, b) for conflating STRAUSS and CORBIN's approach with 
GLASER's. To an extent STRÜBING is justified, since he can point to the specific 
sections in QA and BQR, and other writings, where STRAUSS alludes to 
Pragmatist ideas—particularly DEWEY; also to STRAUSS' attempts to engage 
with some of the philosophical ideas that concern issues such as the nature of 
data, the interaction between the researcher and the research context, and so on. 
Unfortunately, these issues were not really developed in a concerted manner by 
STRAUSS in his key GTM writings; an observation that STRÜBING himself 
makes (2007). The result was that an increasingly wide range of researchers 
claimed use of GTM—invoking the GT mantra, "all is data", often without any 
further elaboration, referring to Discovery—but usually with no further depth or 
explication. [13]
One of the key texts that influenced the Chicago School was W.I. THOMAS' 
paper on The Definition of the Situation (1923); particularly its oft-quoted 
apothegm "if men define things as real, then they are real in their consequences". 
And this can be applied to the situation around GTM in the 1980s and early 
1990s; the reality being very much a case of a method that had got left behind in 
terms of its engagement with contemporary methodological debates—an 
unfortunate outcome given its innovative and radical potential. So whatever the 
reasons and justifications for this state of affairs, by the early 1990s GTM was 
indeed defined by many researchers as a naively inductivist method—whether of 
the STRAUSS-CORBIN or GLASER variety—and so this was a real 
consequence. This gave ample grounds for criticisms and negative evaluations of 
GTM, and it was CHARMAZ' work in particular that initiated the development of a 
more profoundly justified base for the method, particularly in the English-speaking 
world. [14]
The constructivist form engaged with the problematic issue of data and the active 
role of the researcher in the process of conceptual development. Ideas such as 
emergence and discovery were eschewed or reinterpreted accordingly. A longer 
account together with several later chapters exemplifying these developments 
can be found in the Handbook (BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007b). [15]
Whatever its strengths, weaknesses and ambiguities, the popularity of GTM grew 
and the method has become truly international, including not just the English-
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speaking world, but also in the German speaking world where STRAUSS is 
widely regarded as a key figure in social theory as well as in research methods. 
There are also significant bodies of work using GTM amongst French and 
Hispanic researchers, and the Scandinavian and Asian GTM communities are 
also vibrant. [16]
The present context is that it is now possible to identify several different forms or 
schools of GTM. There are three broad approaches to GTM: the GLASER 
variety, as exemplified particularly in Theoretical Sensitivity and his many 
publications since that time, as well as those listed on the Grounded Theory 
Institute website2; the CORBIN and STRAUSS variety, specifically as exemplified 
in QA and BQR editions one and two; the BRYANT and CHARMAZ variety, 
particularly associated with CHARMAZ' extensive body of work (CHARMAZ, 
1983, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c), and our recent 
collaborations such as the introductory chapters in The Handbook of Grounded 
Theory (BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007a, 2007b). [17]
Some have listed as many as seven different forms (DENZIN, 2007); our 
preferred term is "a family" as we (BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007a) explain in the 
introduction to the Handbook, although we recognise that the issue remains of 
how far one can go with altering or revising GTM basic tenets before one ceases 
to be doing GTM. STRAUSS also recognised this, hence his claim in QA that 
GTM is a "style of doing qualitative research ... with distinctive features" (1987, 
p.5). GLASER is distinctly unhappy with our position, as he makes clear in his 
book Jargonizing: The Use of the GT Vocabulary (2009) which is an extended 
analysis of all the chapters in the Handbook. [18]
1.4 GTM—Basis for qualitative research
The initial motivation of GLASER and STRAUSS was to demonstrate how some 
forms of qualitative research could claim a robustness and authority equal to 
quantitative research. This was an important project since qualitative approaches 
were seen as at best second class methods compared to quantitative ones. 
Rather than seeking entirely novel claims to respectability, GLASER and 
STRAUSS undertook the project of grounding GTM using many of the terms 
already established by the entrenched, quantitatively-oriented orthodoxy. Thus 
the early GTM texts provided justificatory procedures aimed at many of the 
targets already established for quantitative research; including use of research 
data, induction, open-mindedness, and prediction and control. In so doing, 
however, GLASER and STRAUSS often re-interpreted the terms, or raised new 
issues around them. [19]
For instance the idea of open-mindedness was always implicit or even explicit for 
all forms of research. The English phrase "begging the question", increasingly 
used in the sense of "raising the question", more accurately refers to the way in 
which some research hypotheses actually contain the conclusion in the premises 
2 http://www.groundedtheory.com/  
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of the research itself. Quantitative research is usually seen as incorporating 
safeguards against this, including such ideas as the null hypothesis, double-blind 
testing and so on. But in the GTM context the concept of open-mindedness came 
to be understood to imply that researchers should not investigate the existing 
work and research literature most closely related to their topics. This led to many 
problems, particularly where research proposals were expected to make the case 
for funding or support in terms of the novelty of the work, considered against the 
context of what had already been achieved by others in the same field. [20]
On the other hand, there was also a fiercely critical element in GTM that directly 
eschewed some of the standard concepts of proper research—e.g. hypothesis 
testing, pre-prepared coding formats, verification, and extensive engagement with 
the literature. In some respects, however, GLASER and STRAUSS' forms of 
endorsement were even more stringent than those used by the quantitative 
research establishment itself: For instance their continued and unequivocal stress 
on the necessity for open-mindedness, the passivity of the researcher, the 
positivist or realist concept of data, and the reliance on induction. It is certainly 
possible to point to examples and extracts in the early joint statements of GTM, 
as well as the later distinct ones of STRAUSS and GLASER, that appear to offer 
a more active view of the researcher, a more sophisticated concept of data, and 
less strict adherence to induction; but again, the overall impact of these writings, 
in terms of the ways in which researchers have taken them on board, indicates 
otherwise. As will be seen later, this is what is so perplexing about GTM and in 
particular STRAUSS' role in its development. [21]
The three founding texts of GTM (GLASER & STRAUSS, 1965, 1967, 1968) are 
full of these ideas, although they are also replete with other statements that lead 
in very different directions; but it is the former ones that are usually taken up most 
avidly by those seeking to use the method. The result is that although the three 
texts have been described as "the best tutorial on GTM", this is not actually the 
case. Discovery (1967), Awareness (1965), and Time (1968) taken together offer 
extended examples and justification for the sort of research endeavours that 
GLASER and STRAUSS were so keen to encourage and promote; but their 
intended audience was at least as much their academic peers as the early career 
researchers they hoped to encourage. Thus the three books taken as a whole 
were simultaneously offering a critique of existing research practices and 
exemplifying innovative ones. Awareness contained an Appendix dealing with 
some aspects of the method; and Discovery was offered as an extended 
overview. The authors of Discovery were seemingly intent on at least three 
objectives; convincing practising sociologists and social analysts of the strengths 
and potentialities of GTM, illustrating their work with examples that would assist 
those already researching in these areas, and outlining the key elements of the 
method for teachers and novice researchers: the gatekeepers; the practitioners; 
the apprentices. Not surprisingly the reception by each group was somewhat 
mixed, and the efforts to achieve these disparate goals was at times 
counterproductive: Hence the continued clamour for a form of GTM manual. [22]
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What was perhaps surprising, and certainly encouraging, was the way in which 
GTM became so widely recognised in the 10-15 years after publication of 
Discovery. During this period STRAUSS had begun to develop his work and 
research at University of California San Francisco (UCSF), and for a few years 
GLASER had worked as his assistant. The UCSF doctoral programme was small, 
and UCSF was hardly one of the key centres for sociological research; although it 
was certainly one of the key centres for research into medical sociology and 
health care in the widest senses. GLASER only held his post at UCSF for a few 
years, from which time on he has not held any academic teaching post, although 
he has been enormously active in propagating GTM, particularly in the form of his 
numerous publications and seminars. STRAUSS on the other hand continued to 
work and publish, and many of his doctoral students worked with him on several 
large research projects. Moreover many of his former students took up academic 
appointments and so increased researchers' awareness of GTM. [23]
By the early 1980s knowledge of GTM was beginning to spread, largely through 
the efforts of the former doctoral students from the UCSF programme, and also 
through STRAUSS lecturing in the US and Germany; although GTM was hardly a 
major item on many research methods programmes in the more traditional social 
research institutions. But there was a growing demand amongst PhD students 
eager to learn more about the method. According to KEARNEY (2007), 
STRAUSS lectured extensively across the US and in Germany, until he was 
forced to curtail such activities due to his ill-health. He was constantly asked for a 
set of guidelines on how to use GTM in research projects. STRAUSS sought to 
evade these requests for something akin to a GTM manual, but eventually, in 
collaboration with Julie CORBIN, he published BQR. This had at least two far-
reaching results. First it led to an increased recognition of GTM, such that by the 
late 1990s, GTM was far and away the most widely claimed method for social 
researchers; according to some measures eclipsing all other methods put 
together. Second, it led to GLASER's very public critique of BQR, particularly his 
own rejoinder, Basics of GT Analysis, where he broke with STRAUSS in a very 
indignant manner—referring to STRAUSS and CORBIN's book as "without 
conscience bordering on immorality" (1992, p.5). [24]
Given STRAUSS' intellectual background, it might be thought that the split 
between the two founders was centred on issues that could be traced back to 
their respective and differing backgrounds and intellectual influences. But if 
anything, GLASER and STRAUSS were on the opposite sides to what might have 
been expected. STRAUSS, in the form of BQR was offering a somewhat 
mechanistic approach to qualitative research; with GLASER staunchly defending 
the open-ended, data-driven approach first put forward in Discovery. To an extent 
this was an ironic reversal of the bases of the initial collaboration, where 
STRAUSS had contrasted his own intuitive orientation with GLASER's more 
systematic one (see above). As far as GLASER was concerned, BQR presented 
a form of qualitative research that was shorn of all the richness and promise of 
GTM. STRAUSS on the other hand appeared to see QA and BQR fundamentally 
as more expansive statements of the method, more readily accessible to early 
career researchers. [25]
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1.5 A critical non-engagement
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the disagreement, what was noteworthy was 
that both forms of GTM continued to shy away from engaging with issues about 
data, induction, and the role of the researcher. All of which were key topics for 
debate amongst social scientists in the 1970s and 1980s. This evasion or 
prevarication may well have contributed to the rising popularity of GTM, since it 
appeared to avoid all the epistemological pitfalls that seemed to befall other 
methods—particularly qualitative ones. The GTM-oriented researcher could claim 
that whatever the findings might be, they were grounded in the data; and this 
could be demonstrated by the strong conceptual links between the data, codes, 
categories and resulting substantive grounded theory itself: and with regard to 
many fluent and persuasive GTM accounts, whatever their provenance or 
foundation, this was indeed the case. Those well versed in the relevant history 
and literature can point to STRAUSS' role as a key figure linking Pragmatism and 
Symbolic Interactionism, acting as a conduit for the ideas of DEWEY and MEAD. 
But this simply increases the perplexity regarding his lack of attention to these 
sorts of issue in his GTM writing. [26]
The result was that by the late 1990s the research literature was full of claims to 
be using GTM; some clearly focused on STRAUSS and CORBIN's BQR, some 
drawing on GLASER's Theoretical Sensitivity, and some using both plus 
Discovery. BQR was particularly important in this regard since students could 
point to something akin to a methods manual, with clearly outlined steps and 
stages presented in a systematic manner. Thus research proposals based 
around this could be understood by those unfamiliar with qualitative research in 
general, and GTM in particular. But if BQR lent some weight to the argument for 
using GTM, two other aspects worked against this. First there was GLASER's 
condemnation of BQR, encompassing his critique of STRAUSS' trajectory not 
only after but even during their initial collaboration. Second there was the 
increasingly common way in which some researchers were claiming to use GTM 
while clearly not doing so in any manner whatever. GTM came to be seen as a 
way in which researchers could evade issues such as familiarity with the 
literature, clear framing of research questions, and forms of data analysis. [27]
So through the late 1980s and early 1990s anyone attempting to understand what 
GTM was from this plethora of ideas, concepts and criticisms was likely to end up 
in a state of utter confusion and exasperation. What rescued GTM from simply 
slipping into disrepute and misuse was the increasing number of researchers who 
persevered with the method and managed to produce well-respected and widely 
referenced research reports and publications often regardless of the particular 
GTM line to which they claimed adherence. Examples include Adele CLARKE, 
Joan FUJIMURA, Susan Leigh STAR, Fritz SCHUETZE, Isabelle BASZANGER, 
Wanda ORLIKOWSKI; in some cases the authors of these studies claimed 
adherence to GLASER's GTM, others claimed adherence to STRAUSS and 
CORBIN, and others either seemed to be unaware of the split between the 
founders or simply ignored it. [28]
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1.6 Growth and renewal
By the latter half of the 1990s there was both a body of GTM-based research, 
and amongst those using and teaching the method, a realisation that statements 
about GTM had to contend with issues about data, induction, the role of the 
researcher, prior knowledge, team working, plus other specific institutional issues 
such as approval by an Institutional Review Board [IRB], ethics committee or 
equivalent, hypothesis testing, issues of gender, race, ethnicity and so on. In 
many regards the critical role was played by those who advanced a view of GTM 
based unequivocally and centrally around interpretivism or constructivism, some 
of them building explicitly on the Symbolic Interactionism with which STRAUSS 
was also associated, given his background with the Chicago school. From these 
bases it was possible to take into account the active role of the researcher, deal 
with issues around data and knowledge, and engage with the general changes in 
and challenges to concepts of science, knowledge, and general theoretical 
development. Moreover this allowed an aligning of GTM with a different set of 
justificatory procedures for research outcomes, based on the precept that 
knowledge was provisional, consensual, and dependent on the researcher's (or 
researchers') perspectives. It might be contended that these sorts of concern 
were always present in GTM, but it is only in the work of GTM researchers 
subsequent to GLASER and STRAUSS that these issues are made more explicit, 
and put to greater effect, particularly in the light of the development of an 
avowedly constructivist form of GTM. [29]
This is not to say that researchers following GLASER's or STRAUSS and 
CORBIN's writings were not producing valuable and insightful results, some 
undoubtedly were, and continue to do so; but all too often the methodological 
justification and claimed research basis were woefully inadequate or 
inappropriate. The constructivist version was not without its detractors, but at 
least this was an argument between explicitly stated and contending views of 
epistemology and ontology, rather than what appeared to be simply an evasion of 
these issues altogether. [30]
Yet at the heart of the constructivist turn lies a paradox. Once one moves away 
from a position whereby knowledge claims are seen to be founded on some form 
of true and accurate representations of reality—terms such as positivism, post-
positivism, realism, representationalism, and foundationalism all apply here—then 
there is a tendency to move towards an uneasy relativism and a form of 
epistemological special pleading. This can easily lead to the ultimate caricature of 
post-modernism, whereby any and every claim to knowledge is upheld as equally 
valid; based on the tenet that all forms of knowledge claim are relevant or 
contextually appropriate or legitimate. This is itself a knowledge claim with 
pretensions to universal validity. So out and out constructivism is a contradiction 
in terms, as many positivists and others of their ilk gleefully and correctly point 
out. [31]
With this in mind, GLASER's un-reconstituted, classic position, which evades and 
avoids all engagement with issues of epistemology and the like, has at least as 
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much merit as the constructivist one. (The same can be said of STRAUSS and 
CORBIN's.) If GLASER's GTM rests on a fairytale in which the handsome 
grounded theorist always lives happily ever after with the data from which the 
relevant concepts emerge; the post-modern constructivist's GTM is just as 
incredible, with a whole host of handsome grounded theorists living happily ever 
after, each with their own, incommensurate data from which they idiosyncratically 
develop their constructed concepts. [32]
The net result is that the GTM landscape appears somewhat flawed. The failure 
of both GLASER's and STRAUSS' variants to engage with concerns regarding 
the nature and status of data, induction, and key issues surrounding knowledge 
claims offers too many obvious targets to those who wish to condemn GTM 
outright. Furthermore the dispute itself allows critics to dismiss GTM as self-
contradictory and ill-founded. On the other hand GTM is dismissed by those 
advocates of traditional, quantitatively-oriented approaches because of the GTM 
position with regard to initial hypotheses, testing and validation, and engagement 
with the literature and other requirements of the disciplinary authorities. Even 
though advocates of GTM can point to all manner of statements and arguments 
that justify the method, all too often this is to no avail. [33]
GLASER and STRAUSS' concern, in Discovery in particular, that GTM should in 
some ways match up to the same or equivalent standards of robustness and 
rigour that characterised the traditional methods has proved to be something of a 
poisoned chalice. The gate-keepers of the traditional research communities have 
largely rejected the claims of GTM as a method for achieving rigorous research 
results. This is somewhat ironic given that there is in many cases broad if 
superficial agreement on many epistemological points between GLASER and the 
positivist advocates of the primacy of quantitative methods—e.g. their views of 
data, the role of induction, the passive role of the researcher (although in many 
other key regards their views are diametrically opposed). [34]
Moreover anyone looking to STRAUSS' restatement, or rather STRAUSS and 
CORBIN's, as a form of clarification will be disappointed; BQR may well have 
been the text of preference for researchers using the method from the late 1980s 
onwards; but GLASER's criticisms do indeed hit home: Anyone seeking to use 
GTM simply from a reading of BQR would have departed significantly from the 
ideas put forward, albeit in a highly nuanced manner, in Discovery, Awareness 
and Time; and in so doing would have been in danger of losing much of the 
richness and promise of the method. [35]
The constructivist version, particularly as it has developed in the recent work of 
CHARMAZ and myself—both separately and in concert (CHARMAZ, 2000a; 
BRYANT, 2002; BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007a, b)—does at least take up the 
methodological challenges of the last 30 years, and begins to provide a clear and 
more robust basis for researchers and those involved in examining and 
accrediting research plans and outputs. But there is still the issue of the extent to 
which this form of GTM can provide and sustain knowledge claims against the 
criticisms of the positivists, realists, or whatever. Added to which, the GTM 
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community as a whole has yet to clarify the ways in which concepts, substantive 
theories and formal theories afford a basis for knowledge, practice and further 
research. [36]
All of this is not to detract from the clear popularity of the method in all of its 
forms; nor should it be thought for a moment that these issues are unique to 
GTM. Concerns about data, induction, knowledge claims, robustness, verifiability, 
replication and so on beset all methods and forms of enquiry and research; GTM 
just happens to exemplify and illustrate many of them in particularly clear and 
graphic fashion, and their potential resolution in this context offers insights above 
and beyond GTM itself. So in dealing with some of the issues around different 
parts of the family of GTM, a more generic form of clarification is on offer: one 
with more grab. [37]
2. GTM and Pragmatism
2.1 STRAUSS and Pragmatism
A starting point for the resolution or remedy lies in a key feature of STRAUSS' 
own background; indeed in an area with which he continued to engage up to and 
including his very last writings: Pragmatism. What will be argued in the remainder 
of this paper is that STRAUSS' Pragmatism was almost certainly a key influence 
in the early development of GTM, but was largely dormant or neglected in the 
ensuing developments and splits of the 1980s and 1990s. This disregard can now 
be seen as a critical weakness in the general development of GTM, and 
overcoming it offers a profound and promising path for the development of GTM 
specifically and the agenda for social research in general. [38]
The importance of Pragmatism for GTM was noticed by some of its adherents, 
particularly those in the German-speaking world such as Hans JOAS (1987), Jo 
REICHERTZ (2007), Udo KELLE (2007) and Jörg STRÜBING (2007). In some 
instances their interest was itself ignited by STRAUSS himself or by those who 
had themselves been influenced by and collaborated with STRAUSS. But even 
they have had to admit that STRAUSS himself failed to draw upon Pragmatism in 
any sustained manner in his published GTM work. [39]
STRAUSS was always keen to stress that American Pragmatism was a central 
component in his intellectual formation. According to STRÜBING (personal 
communication), STRAUSS was introduced to the work of DEWEY and JAMES 
by Floyd HOUSE, his teacher while he was an undergraduate at Virginia 
University in the 1930s. Later as he developed his interests in both psychology 
and sociology, STRAUSS used ideas from DEWEY and MEAD as his own work 
on action, structure and process developed. DEWEY and PEIRCE are mentioned 
in QA, and the first two editions of BQR open with a quote from DEWEY's Art as 
Experience (1934). In his final book, Continual, STRAUSS makes extensive 
reference to Pragmatism in the introduction where he charts his own intellectual 
development, but this is specifically oriented around the work of DEWEY 
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understood through the teaching of G.H. MEAD and later developments of the 
Chicago school. [40]
2.2 Varieties of Pragmatic experience
The term Pragmatism itself was popularised by William JAMES3, although he 
always credited Charles PEIRCE with its origination; albeit giving an incorrect 
source4. PEIRCE himself later tried to distance himself from the positions 
advocated by JAMES and DEWEY, offering the term "Pragmaticism" for his own 
position. (PEIRCE himself noted that it was a term so ugly that no-one else would 
use it—see PEIRCE, 1998.) Pragmatism was seen as a specifically American, 
and somewhat peripheral contribution to philosophical thought, and after DEWEY 
(who left no obvious successors) it fell into relative neglect from late 1930s until 
revived and revised from the 1980s onwards by the neo-Pragmatists, particularly 
and most significantly Richard RORTY, but also Hilary PUTNAM (1995) and 
Donald DAVIDSON (1985)5. [41]
John DEWEY in particular has been re-discovered and justifiably elevated into a 
philosophical grandee in recent years; to a large extent a result of RORTY's 
efforts. His preferred term for what we now understand as Pragmatism was 
Instrumentalism. In the context of GTM, it is interesting to note that DEWEY was 
a colleague of G.H. MEAD in Chicago, but later moved to Columbia. This was no 
more than coincidence, and in the case of Columbia, DEWEY left no lasting 
influence in the form of adherent or research students. (DEWEY did leave an 
influence at Teachers College—now part of Columbia, but a separate 
establishment in DEWEY's time.) On the other hand, DEWEY's influence on 
STRAUSS is readily apparent from the latter's own writings as will be shown 
below. [42]
Although there is no single school of Pragmatism, there are a number of key 
themes shared by most if not all those who adopt that label or have had it thrust 
upon them. One of the primary tenets, particularly stressed by DEWEY (1917), 
was the disavowal of what he termed "the spectator theory of knowledge", with its 
connotations of passive observation of an accessible and unproblematic reality; a 
world-in-itself awaiting discovery. In its place DEWEY proposed "the experimental 
theory of knowledge", where all knowledge is seen as provisional, and is judged 
in terms of how useful it is for the knowing subjects. RORTY took up both of 
these specific aspects in his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980) that 
attacked the concept of a correspondence theory of truth—i.e. the idea that truth 
claims could be judged in terms of how close they were to reality itself. [43]
For Pragmatists knowledge exists in the form of statements or theories which are 
best seen as instruments or tools; coping mechanisms, not once-and-for-all-time 
3 The title of this subsection echoes JAMES' work The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902).
4 William JAMES 1898 lecture at UC Berkeley, but earlier works had laid the foundation, see 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/pragmati.htm [accessed: June 9, 2009].
5 MURPHY's discussion of Pragmatism is a useful introduction and guide to further reading of 
both primary and secondary sources (MURPHY, 1990).
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truths. Consequently we must always allow that all and any of our current tools 
may be surpassed in the future—this is what is meant by the term fallibilism. 
RORTY sums this up with the argument that any of our ideas must be open to 
doubt (including this one); but on the other hand not all at once. He evokes 
NEURATH's image of our conceptual toolset as a raft on which we are floating; 
where in the long term we will have to replace all the planks, but only one at a 
time! (STRÜBING offered the important clarification of this precept in his 
comments on an early draft of this paper, pointing out that PEIRCE himself 
stressed that by "doubt" he meant "practical doubt", not a generic and all-
encompassing form of Cartesian scepticism.) [44]
What DEWEY averred was that there can be no Archimedean fixed points from 
which to observe reality, and no appeals to "raw experience"; hence no universal 
and context-free claims to truth. All knowledge is provisional, and has to be 
judged in terms of its usefulness within some set of confines—hence DEWEY's 
term Instrumentalism.6 [45]
RORTY takes this still further in stating that there is no extra-linguistic reality for 
us to represent, and no extra-linguistic way of representation. DEWEY himself 
was perhaps more nuanced, but few writers are less nuanced than RORTY! The 
result is that, for Pragmatists such as RORTY, knowledge is not a hierarchical 
structure, with science or philosophical insight at the top and other lesser forms, 
such as common-sense, or practical wisdom in inferior positions. Rather 
knowledge is a web or a network of statements rather than an edifice, and the 
value of any form of knowledge is its usefulness and applicability which may be 
constrained in terms of time and place and user. RORTY approvingly quotes 
NIETZSCHE's dictum that what passes for "truth"—or more poignantly "The 
Truth"—is in fact "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms" (quoted by RORTY, 1991, p.3). [46]
Another key aspect of Pragmatism, and an exceedingly useful one, is what might 
be termed the "so what?" principle, or the difference principle—i.e. for any 
argument, particularly one about metaphysics or foundations or similar, one must 
ask "what practical difference would it make if either I or my opponent was 
correct/incorrect?" If the answer is "none", then forget it!7 [47]
2.3 Fallibilism
There are two key corollaries of the Pragmatist position, shared by many 
Pragmatists of different hues, not simply DEWEY and RORTY. The first is the 
rejection of any quest for certainty, a position with political and ethical 
6 Much of what follows concerning Pragmatism is derived from RORTY—he makes extensive use 
of the work of other neo-Pragmatists such as DAVIDSON and PUTNAM, but they are not in 
complete agreement on all issues. The collection on Rorty and his Critics (BRANDOM, 2000) 
illustrates the issues on which there is both substantive agreement and disagreement.
7 In some cases these differences of opinion may be well worth pursuing. DEWEY's ideas about 
difference are echoed in Gregory BATESON's oft quoted definition of information—"the 
difference that makes a difference" (1979)—and takes on a deeper meaning when associated 
with DEWEY. BATESON also took up PEIRCE's idea about abduction.
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ramifications. In far too many cases certainty leads to despotism, fanaticism or 
intolerance; it also blocks progress. VOLTAIRE famously observed that while 
doubt is uncomfortable, certainty is ridiculous8. The Pragmatists argue that 
certainty is more than ridiculous, it can lead to "cocksure dogmatism" and worse; 
the only alternative is fallibilism. This should not, however, be confused with 
scepticism, particularly of the Cartesian variety which proceeds by disbelieving 
anything that appears doubtful with the eventual aim of arriving at a basis of 
certainty. [48]
The first corollary then springs from the Pragmatist rejection of Cartesian 
Rationalism; the second corollary relates to a rejection of Lockean Empiricism 
which is premised on a model of the mind as an empty vessel, which is then filled 
by the senses that a person experiences. LOCKE used the term tabula rasa, a 
blank slate, coupled with the dictum that "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius 
fuerit in sensu" [Nothing is in the understanding that was not earlier in the 
senses]9. For Pragmatists the mind is neither self-contained, which is one of the 
key precepts of Cartesianism, nor is it an empty vessel embodied in a passive 
observer10. On the contrary, DEWEY's specific objective was to counter what he 
termed "the spectator view of knowledge", instead placing action and 
emancipation at the centre. The following quote is worth producing in full as it 
neatly encapsulates some of the key features of Pragmatism.
"According to such Cartesianism, the mind is a self-contained sphere whose contents
—'ideas' or 'impressions'—are irredeemably subjective and private, and utterly 
sundered from the public and objective world they purport to represent. Once we 
accept this picture of the mind as a world unto itself, we must confront a host of 
knotty problems—about solipsism, skepticism, realism, and idealism—with which 
empiricists have long struggled. Pragmatists have expressed their opposition to this 
Cartesian picture in many ways: Peirce's view that beliefs are rules for action; 
James's teleological understanding of the mind; Dewey's Darwinian-inflected 
ruminations on experience; Popper's mockery of the 'bucket theory of the mind'; 
Wittgenstein's private language argument; Rorty's refusal to view the mind as 
Nature's mirror; and Davidson's critique of 'the myth of the subjective'. In these and 
other cases, the intention is emancipatory: Pragmatists see themselves as freeing 
philosophy from optional assumptions which have generated insoluble and unreal 
problems." (McDERMID, 2006, n.p.) [49]
So although there is indeed a wide "variety of the pragmatic experience", many of 
the issues discussed so far are common to most of them. Moreover the trend that 
starts from DEWEY and extends to RORTY is the key one with regard to GTM, 
particularly since STRAUSS himself makes continued reference to DEWEY in his 
8 http://www.people.ubr.com/authors/by-first-name/v/voltaire/voltaire-quotes.aspx  
9 This is termed "The Peripatetic Axiom", and this version is attributed to Thomas Aquinas 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_axiom. 
10 Hence the aphorism from PLUTARCH which we chose for the Handbook—"The mind is not a 
vessel to be filled, but a fire to be ignited" (BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007c). 
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own work, and traces his own intellectual development through DEWEY, MEAD 
and what he terms "Chicago Pragmatism".11 [50]
2.4 Pragmatism—A red thread and a lifeline
STRAUSS himself in charting his own intellectual development (Continual) 
stressed the importance of Pragmatism (specifically Chicago Pragmatism which 
he contrasted with Chicago Sociology) in his own intellectual formation, and the 
ways in which it remained a constant influence on his work—"a red thread 
running through my work" (1993, p.22). Yet he did this largely against the 
background of his work on developing a theory of action. He mentions GTM but 
only in the sense that the 
"methodology as developed in close and equal collaboration by Barney Glaser and 
me, evolved out of this sense of complexity that we shared; in this instance, the 
complexity of interaction and interactional forms that we were studying as played out 
in the care of dying patients" (1993, p.12). [51]
As was mentioned earlier (Section 2.1), there is already a substantial body of 
work on the links between Pragmatism and Straussian GTM, but the more 
general and mutually supportive relationship between GTM as a whole and 
Pragmatism needs to be brought to the forefront of debate. What I wish to offer in 
sections 3 and 4 of this paper is a foundation upon which the "red thread" can be 
broadened and strengthened in such as way that many of the disputes and 
ambiguities that have beset GTM can be resolved or dispelled. [52]
GTM developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s against the background of the 
distinct standpoints offered by GLASER and STRAUSS/CORBIN respectively. 
But this divergence itself developed against, but remote from, a background of 
philosophical and cognitive upheavals whose roots can be traced back to the 
work of Thomas KUHN, Harold GARFINKEL and others that date from the 1960s 
(KUHN, 1962; GARFINKEL, 1967). As has been argued extensively elsewhere 
(BRYANT, 2002; BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007b) neither GLASER nor STRAUSS 
or CORBIN ever responded directly to what has been termed the post-modern 
turn. The result was that for many GTM was simply beyond the pale in 
methodological terms, completely isolated from the various epistemological and 
ontological debates that had been unleashed with the post-modern 
disenchantment with traditional Enlightenment values and concepts such as 
science, knowledge, and understanding. Yet there was dissatisfaction with this 
deafening silence from within GTM, and it led to a series of efforts to articulate a 
more robust and resilient basis for the method, engaging with the debates of the 
time. CHARMAZ in her work since the early 1990s spearheaded what has 
become termed "Constructivist GTM", later reinforced by my own work (initially 
developed independently), our joint efforts, and also those of others such as 
CLARKE (2005). [53]
11 For some reason STRAUSS never refers to William JAMES in any of his references to 
Pragmatism.
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The net result of this has been that GTM now has a firmer conceptual basis, 
since those using the method can now point to various ways in which the 
method's key concepts, claims and orientations can be located against existing 
research and methodological issues and concerns. This is particularly important 
for PhD students and researchers seeking publication outlets and career 
opportunities—something that lay at the heart of GLASER and STRAUSS' initial 
endeavours. But it has also led to some confusion both with regard to the method 
itself and to the more general issue of the knowledge claims that researchers can 
make. [54]
With regard to the more general point, one of the impacts of post-modern 
thinking has been a tendency to a position of relativism which in its more extreme 
forms implies that all knowledge claims are merely matters of opinion or 
orientation to be accepted, tolerated or rejected as questions of personal taste: 
De scientia non est disputandum!12 In other words claims to knowledge, like 
matters of taste, are subjective and so not open to argument. This can be seen 
as a strength on the part of the proponents of post-modernism, and as a fatal 
weakness by its critics. Moreover even in its weaker forms, the post-modern turn 
has severe implications for concepts such as evidence, data, and explanation. 
The attraction of GLASER's classic GTM is that it offers clear and deceptively 
simple statements such as the following:
1) "The analyst can start anywhere in the data and trust to the emergence in open 
coding" (1992, p.48).
2) "GT comes from data, but does not describe the data from which it emerges" 
(2001, p.4).
3) "Constructivist Grounded Theory (GT) is a misnomer. GT can use any data; it 
remains to be figured out what it is. In my book 'The Grounded Theory Perspective' 
(GLASER, 2001) I wrote a chapter (11) that dealt with 'all is data.' I said: 
' "All is data" is a well known Glaser dictum. What does it mean? It means exactly 
what is going on in the research scene is the data, whatever the source, whether 
interview, observations, documents, in whatever combination. It is not only what is 
being told, how it is being told and the conditions of its being told, but also all the data 
surrounding what is being told. It means what is going on must be figured out exactly 
what it is is (sic) used for, that is conceptualization, not for accurate description. Data 
is always as good as far as it goes, and there is always more data to keep correcting 
the categories with more relevant properties.' (p.145)" (2002, [1]) [55]
This evades and avoids the epistemological morass opened up with the advent of 
post-modernism; although the issues themselves have a far longer history, dating 
back to the earliest ideas that philosophers and others offered with regard to the 
nature of knowledge and the activities involved in knowing. STRAUSS and 
CORBIN are slightly more ambiguous in their writings, but generally tend towards 
12 The original version is De gustibus non est disputandum—"there is no arguing about tastes". 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_gustibus_non_est_disputandum. 
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GLASER's position on these aspects, particularly given STRAUSS' use of 
GLASER's work in his writings—see above13. [56]
Unfortunately this evasion cannot be sustained, particularly for PhD students and 
early career researchers who are expected to be able to position themselves 
against the current context of debates on methods and philosophical positions 
such as positivism, constructivism, and the like. This is particularly important for 
all researchers using and advocating use of qualitative methods, since there is 
usually a greater onus on such researchers to justify and ground their 
approaches—those using quantitative methods tend to have an easier time in this 
regard, although they may have to endure severe questioning about the details of 
their use of a particular method or model. [57]
The constructivist turn in GTM may then be seen by some as complicating the 
method, but this was unavoidable if GTM was to continue to be regarded as a 
valid research approach in many disciplines. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in 
the next section, working through the constructivist critique to a GTM that is more 
explicitly Pragmatist results in a far more coherent GTM which can be justified 
and defended expansively and profoundly: in effect turning the red thread into a 
lifeline. [58]
3. Key Features of GTM Reconsidered in the Light of Pragmatism
3.1 The issues for GTM
The ramifications of the constructivist critique and restatement of GTM were 
important in drawing attention to a number of core aspects of the method; in 
particular concerns about research questions and hypotheses, iteration of data 
gathering and analysis, the role of the researcher in aspects such as derivation of 
codes and concepts, the status of theory, the role of practice, and the use of 
data. Each of these will be considered in turn in the sections that follow. At this 
stage a more general point needs to be made concerning the way in which 
Pragmatism in its recent articulations, particularly RORTY's, offers a way of 
moving beyond the inevitable but unavoidable upheaval caused by the 
constructivist turn to a more robust GTM that sheds new light on the initial GTM 
statements of GLASER and STRAUSS, as well as their later distinctive writings. 
The work of RORTY and others provides a basis for a re-interpretation and re-
statement of some of the key features of GTM which draws the seemingly 
disparate ideas of GLASER, STRAUSS, and the constructivists closer together. [59]
This re-interpretation of the roots of GTM, linking it far more specifically to 
Pragmatism, can help to counter the most extreme and uncomfortable aspects of 
the upheavals alluded to earlier. For example some of the most awkward aspects 
of GTM, particularly in the early writings of GLASER and STRAUSS, emanate 
from the use of terms such as fit, grab, saturation, work, and theoretical 
sensitivity. Anyone expecting traditional criteria for precision and clarity is likely to 
13 GLASER's position remains consistent in this regard as is evidenced in his most recent book 
(2009)—see Chapter 2 Data Worries.
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be severely disappointed and perplexed by such statements; and they are not 
simply present in the early texts. GLASER continues to use them in his writings, 
and STRAUSS in Continual talks of a concept "earning its way" (1993, p.53)—a 
phrase he attributes to "my colleague Barney Glaser". In many regards 
statements such as these are often seen as troublesome features of the method. 
Students ask repeatedly for some clear and concise criteria for developing and 
evaluating their concepts and codes, and the use of such inexact terms and 
folksy idioms can result in them feeling that GTM cannot really offer a viable route 
to research insights. Those assessing and evaluating such research proposals 
find themselves similarly discomforted. Moreover those surveying the 
methodological scene will treat such critical terminological ambiguities as being 
indicative of severe conceptual weakness in the method as a whole. How does 
one explain to a sceptical examiner or assessor what is meant by grab or fit, or a 
concept earning its way? [60]
Those teaching GTM often find it hard to articulate anything more precise than 
some fairly impressionistic guidelines when confronted by students requesting 
elucidation of these aspects of the method. Yet if we move away from what the 
Pragmatists term "the metaphysics of the real", and instead adopt the Pragmatist 
view that theories and concepts are best considered in terms of their usefulness 
rather than their truthfulness, then a whole host of features of GTM appear in a 
far clearer light. Those who recognise and have written about the Pragmatist 
leanings in STRAUSS' work might contend that this is hardly surprising; but again 
it must be stressed that the actual articulation of this orientation is precisely what 
has been lacking in GTM to date. [61]
3.2 Engaging with the literature
GTM developed in direct response to the context of US academic social science 
research in the 1960s. In their early collaborations GLASER and STRAUSS 
correctly identified some of the key inherent weaknesses in a system largely 
oriented to tinkering with the grand theories of the grand theorists. GTM was 
offered as a radical and distinct alternative, hence the stress on GTM explicitly 
disavowing many of the standard research practices prevalent at the time—i.e. 
GTM researchers should not immerse themselves in the authorised literature, 
should not prepare hypotheses for testing and validation, should aim primarily at 
developing their own concepts and categories as a result of some personal and 
direct engagement with a specific research domain, rather than from secondary 
or tertiary sources. [62]
One of the persistent issues that troubles researchers thinking about using GTM 
is engagement with the literature. GLASER has always maintained the view that 
researchers should shy away from the literature most relevant to their substantive 
research context—although they should immerse themselves in as much 
literature as possible on other, potentially related issues and topics. This is 
problematic in many regards since researchers are often asked to present a 
research proposal that situates the planned research against existing work and 
publications. Moreover, by definition, if they are planning to use GTM, then they 
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may not have any detailed awareness of the research issues and hence of the 
associated literature; they may be researching into areas with which they already 
have extensive familiarity. Although GLASER has some reasonable grounds for 
his admonition, it is more misleading than helpful in the current context of 
research practice. If grounding in the data is crucial, then there is no reason why 
the extant literature cannot be part of that data14. Moreover if we move away from 
the idea of GTM as an inductive method, and instead put stress on the ways in 
which theoretical sensitivity can be encouraged and advanced as a form of 
abduction, then this issue simply disappears. One can never enter a research 
area with an empty head; one can try to do so with an open mind, but sometimes 
it is precisely one's prejudices—in the sense of prior judgements—that provide a 
basis upon which innovative insights can be developed. The Pragmatist concept 
of abduction takes account of this; insights can come from anywhere. Indeed for 
PEIRCE abduction was the only source of innovative insights, while induction and 
deduction were methods for justifying or developing already existing postulates 
(see below Section 3.8). [63]
To a large extent GLASER and STRAUSS' call for researchers to be more 
ambitious, aiming to develop their own concepts rather than testing existing grand 
and not-so-grand theories, is still relevant. So too is their stance against research 
orthodoxies, and this applies even to the "uneasy orthodoxy" that GTM has 
become (see BRYANT & CHARMAZ, in press). Hence researchers need to 
develop their own views about GTM, and present them for consideration. [64]
The key issue, however, arises from the debates about knowledge claims that 
have developed in the period since Discovery first appeared, which now 
challenge some of the assumptions that GLASER and STRAUSS made about 
research preparedness—and in some regards shared with those who were the 
targets of their critique. For example the idea that researchers can approach a 
topic without any preconceptions, or having rid themselves of all prejudices and 
bias, is still perhaps taken seriously by some, but largely derided by most. On the 
contrary, it is now widely understood that it is often precisely people's prejudices 
that enable them to produce innovative insights and alternative models and 
accounts. In challenging the hypothetico-deductive model of the times, GLASER 
and STRAUSS specifically contrasted it with an open-minded, inductive model; 
one that avoided engagement with the authoritative canon. In the ensuing years 
these recommendations have lost their shock value, and are too often seen as 
obstacles to use of GTM itself. [65]
The Pragmatist position15 referred to above is that there are no fixed points from 
which reality can be observed, and hence no appeals to raw experience. This 
undermines the GTM precept of not engaging with the literature if the main 
justification for such an admonition is that by avoiding this engagement, the 
reader-researcher will be in a more neutral or unbiased position: there are no 
14 GLASER clearly agrees with this since his recent book is a grounded theory based entirely on 
one book—The Handbook (BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007c).
15 A reminder that this is my interpretation of "the Pragmatist position", derived almost entirely 
from my reading of DEWEY and RORTY.
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such positions. This is not to say that valuable insights and innovative 
conceptualisations can only come about following an engagement with the 
literature, particularly the grand theories and grand theorists; on the contrary 
there is still value in the GTM precept of initiating one's research with flexibility 
and openness that may preclude a formally stated hypothesis or even a more 
casual research question.16 [66]
3.3 Iteration between data gathering and analysis
GTM was initially labelled as the method of constant comparison, and this 
remains a feature of all varieties of GTM, although its role is far less central in 
STRAUSS and CORBIN's approach than it is in GLASER's. But what is common 
to all variants is the iteration of data gathering and analysis, including continual 
comparison of the findings of one stage with that of the next. Here we have a 
classic instance of the way in which Pragmatism helps dispel some of the most 
problematic dichotomies and dualities that otherwise seem to present 
unavoidable obstacles and distractions to researchers. Essentially the task of 
data gathering can never be completed, and in any case is hardly the mindless 
exercise that is sometimes presented or envisaged. There is always some form of 
analysis going on even as the data is being gathered, but in GTM there is an 
explicit recognition of the iterative relationship between the two, and the ways in 
which they inter-relate and guide each other. As will be seen below, in discussing 
the issue of data as such, the imagery evoked by data gathering is itself highly 
misleading. By extension this more mindful and insightful view of the iterative 
process of data-gathering-cum-analysis explains the idea of theoretical sampling 
that is key to GTM. Theoretical sampling is a means whereby researchers can 
develop their initial theoretical analysis, fleshing out and enhancing the concepts 
identified in the earlier stages of their work. It stands in contrast to 
representational or initial sampling, also to random sampling. For some critics of 
GTM, it might seem to be a case of researchers looking for confirmation of their 
initial ideas, as opposed to trying to falsify or disprove them; but from the 
Pragmatist point of view, it is far more a case of researchers seeking out the 
ways in which their concepts actually work in elucidating the specific research 
context. A good example of this can be found in the founding texts of GTM where 
two key concepts were identified—awareness and trajectory—each one then 
being further developed in specific and distinct ways: hence the two studies 
Awareness and Time. [67]
3.4 Derivation of codes, categories, and concepts
As was noted earlier (Section 2.1) RORTY approvingly quotes NIETZSCHE's 
dictum that "The Truth" is "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms". The quote continues to the effect that the metaphors 
become worn out, like well-used coins where the image has been effaced through 
constant exchange. This is readily apparent in GTM writings where the term 
16 Apart from the Pragmatist argument against strict adherence to this GTM principle, there is also 
a pragmatic one, since in many contexts it is mandatory that there be some form of literature 
review in any research proposal, whether for a PhD or a specific research project.
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emergence is used. Discovery is replete with use of the term; concepts "emerge" 
from the data, theories "emerge" from the concepts and so on. In some of his 
later writings, STRAUSS reduced his use of the term, although it still appears in 
both QA and BQR. The issue is not that the term is metaphorical itself, but that 
use of this metaphor can obscure the issues of where codes, categories, 
concepts, and theories come from, and the processes involved in their derivation 
and articulation. Indeed the metaphor implicitly lends weight to the spectator view 
of knowledge that DEWEY sought to undermine. [68]
BQR relies less on emergence than some of the earlier works, but STRAUSS and 
CORBIN still opt consistently for the passive form in describing the method—i.e. 
the data is collected, is used. The outcome is that little or no consideration is 
given to the active role of the researcher—and the spectator view of knowledge 
and the idea of emergence are thus reinforced.17 [69]
In probing the concept of emergence in this manner, one inevitably raises the 
question: "Where do ideas come from?" GLASER and STRAUSS specifically 
developed GTM as a method that would encourage and give confidence to 
researchers to develop new ideas; but in so doing they seemed to imply that 
simply accruing or gathering data would lead to new concepts and then to new 
theories: hence their claim that GTM was an inductive method. Continued use of 
the term emergence, and an under-developed understanding of induction 
reinforce this assumption (see below Section 3.7). [70]
One alternative to the idea of emergence is the distinction between the context of 
discovery, which can be seen as a psychological or personal process, and the 
context of verification or validation.18 But this goes directly against what GLASER, 
in his inimitable fashion, has termed "immaculate conceptualization" (1978, p.8). 
GLASER's concern is to stress the necessity for the grounding of concepts as 
opposed to encouraging free-floating conjectures. On the other hand there is an 
extended literature on classification, from HUME onwards, and the activities of 
discrimination and categorising have themselves been subject to extensive 
analysis; indeed one of STRAUSS' students—STAR—has co-authored a notable 
text which discusses the ways in which classification systems develop as social 
constructs (BOWKER & STAR, 1999). [71]
In a fashion similar to the discussion in Section 3.2 above, the initial GTM position 
requires some revision, albeit with continued stress on the original rationale. The 
metaphor of emergence needs to be jettisoned. It may well prove to be the case 
that if the same data is supplied to a number of researchers or other colleagues, 
the same or a similar concept will emerge for some or all of them. But it is equally 
17 This is still the case in the 3rd edition—CORBIN and STRAUSS (2008).
18 In the English-speaking world this is widely associated with Karl POPPER, but as the FQS 
editors pointed out, it originated with the work of Hans REICHENBACH.
Note from the FQS editors: Hans REICHENBACH introduced the terms in Chapter I "Meaning" 
of Experience and Prediction (1938, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; see 
http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/Reich(1938,chapter1).htm and also 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reichenbach/ for a short introduction of REICHENBACH and 
POPPER).
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likely that a whole range of differing concepts will be identified. GTM, like all 
research methods and philosophies of knowledge, has to take account of the role 
of the researcher or observer. This is nothing new, nor is it unique to qualitative 
social research. It cannot be avoided by using a passive voice—i.e. the concept 
emerged—there must be unequivocal recognition of the active role of the 
researcher. A Pragmatist development of this issue stresses the active, non-
spectator view of the researcher, but also places equal emphasis on the 
grounded-ness of any knowledge or concepts that are developed. From the 
Pragmatist viewpoint, concepts are tools, and the value of a tool is not its 
universal validity, but its usefulness in a specific context. So while the 
metaphorical baggage associated with emergence must be discarded, the stress 
on the grounded-ness must be retained. GLASER's dismissal of immaculate 
conceptualisation retains its critical force since the value of any conceptual 
argument needs to be convincingly anchored in a substantive research context. [72]
3.5 Status of "theory"
The core concern of GTM is to develop new theories, but what exactly is "a 
theory"? Would we recognise one if we saw one? How could we distinguish 
between strong and weak claims for something being a theory? The term itself is 
ambiguous, and currently that ambiguity is proving particularly troublesome. In 
some cases the term theory denotes a firm basis for further knowledge 
development; for instance EINSTEIN's theory of relativity. But in other cases the 
word denotes something more like a conjecture, a speculative claim rather than a 
well-founded one; for instance someone's theory about why the English football 
team consistently fail to perform well at the World Cup. [73]
This is not only troublesome, but also has political and educational ramifications, 
for instance in the continuing debates concerning the theory of evolution; targeted 
by those keen to promote an equivalence between this theory and what used to 
be called "creationism", but is now termed the "theory of intelligent design" [ID]. 
Those advocating ID often point to what they term "Darwinism" as something that 
is "only a theory"—i.e. theory in the sense of a speculative claim—whereas those 
who see ID as merely one current form of Biblical fundamentalism see the theory 
of evolution as a theory in the sense of a well-attested basis for future research 
and insight. [74]
So in one sense "theory" implies something along the lines of "conjecture" or 
"supposition"; but in another sense it implies something with an enhanced status, 
attained only after exhaustive efforts to test and challenge it. This latter meaning 
is certainly what GLASER and STRAUSS had in mind in arguing for theories to 
be grounded; although when a grounded theory is first developed it can hardly 
claim this status, which can only come with time and the attention of others. 
GLASER and STRAUSS were clearly aware of this distinction between a 
grounded theory when first proposed, and its potential for further development. In 
their work (GLASER & STRAUSS, 1967, 1971; STRAUSS, 1987; GLASER, 
2006, 2007) they continually stressed the distinction between what they termed 
"substantive" and "formal" theories, which amplifies this point. Substantive 
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theories are closely linked to the context in which the research is grounded; only 
later can these theories become formal, after they have been taken up and used 
against other contexts and possibly by other researchers. Trying to clarify the 
distinction between substantive and formal theories is difficult in the abstract, 
although the GTM literature offers many examples starting with STRAUSS' work 
on Negotiations (1978) and GLASER and STRAUSS' work on Status Passage 
(1971). [75]
The problems that people have with the term theory can be readily resolved 
through an understanding of how it has been used by GLASER, STRAUSS and 
others in the GTM context: Theories, like concepts, have to earn their way, 
otherwise they are speculative or simply idle banter. This resonates with 
DEWEY's view of knowledge as instrumental, so that theories are best seen as 
tools. Some tools are highly specific to a task, others are more generally 
adaptable. RORTY (1998, Chapter 1) extends and clarifies this by arguing that 
just as there is no universal tool, so too there are no universally applicable 
theories. (Not even the most expensive conceptual Swiss Army knife!) Thus the 
theory of evolution, just like the theory of relativity, works and has grab and is 
useful. Those arguing in favour of alternatives need to demonstrate that their 
options do likewise. It is pointless simply arguing that the theory of evolution is 
based on "facts" or "data", while ID is merely based on belief. It is far better to 
use the instrumental approach to theories, and so be able to point to the ways in 
which the theory of evolution has earned its keep. [76]
This can also be used as a criterion for theories which are now seen as incorrect 
or surpassed in some manner. For instance many of NEWTON's theories were 
displaced by EINSTEIN's, but they certainly proved their worth by providing a 
basis for many aspects of scientific work and engineering since their inception. By 
adopting this Pragmatist position one can appreciate why some theories do 
indeed earn their keep, without recourse to claims about universality, truth, 
science, and facts. The kernel of this is also at the heart of GTM, although not 
spelled out in this manner. [77]
Theory for GTM then holds a central role and is a primary objective. But it is 
important that researchers understand that grounded theories are not meant to 
be either "speculative" (recall GLASER's admonition against immaculate 
conceptualisation), nor are they meant to be seen as universal explanations. On 
the contrary, researchers should aim to develop their own theories, based around 
central concepts that can be justified by the ways in which they can be shown to 
have been derived from the iterations between engagement with the research 
context and conceptual analysis. Claims for extension or application to other 
contexts may then come at later stages, but even if these cannot be borne out, 
the initial theory should still retain its grab and fit.19 [78]
19 GTM does raise an interesting distinction between theories and concepts, but this also applies 
to other theories; the theory of evolution, the theory of relativity, each is focused on a central 
concept—plus other associated concepts—which taken together afford ways of understanding 
the world and acting with and within it. STRAUSS himself makes an important point in QA when 
he mentions the ways in which he and GLASER developed some of their early work on dying. 
They found that there were two pivotal concepts; awareness and trajectory, but rather than 
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3.6 Practice and practice-led disciplines
The importance of GTM for practice-led disciplines has always been seen as a 
key strength of the method. The early GTM research was carried out in medical 
institutions, partly because STRAUSS had by that time (early 1960s) moved to 
the School of Nursing at UCSF, where he founded the Department of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, and also as a result of the personal experiences of 
bereavement in medically-controlled contexts that GLASER and STRAUSS had 
each, separately, encountered in the early 1960s. But these factors alone cannot 
account for the way in which the method was taken up so widely and 
enthusiastically by practitioners in a wide variety of medically-oriented practices. It 
is often forgotten that GTM had three progenitors, the forgotten one being Jeanne 
QUINT (later Jeanne QUINT BENOLIEL) a professional nurse who joined with 
GLASER and STRAUSS in their earliest GTM studies (see QUINT, 1967). [79]
QUINT later achieved renown in her chosen profession, and it seems reasonable 
to suggest that GTM was from the outset oriented towards practice as a result 
both of her contribution and the fact that GLASER and STRAUSS themselves 
were keen not only to outline an academically-oriented innovative research 
method, but also to ground their ideas in concrete practices. The initial studies 
were embedded in the context of caring for the terminally ill, and there is clear 
continuity in the later work at UCSF with its orientation towards performance-led 
research in the general area of medical and social care. [80]
From the perspective of Pragmatism, the issue of the relationship between theory 
and practice is one of how useful the former is with regard to the latter; theories 
are simply judged in terms of their utility. If a new theory has no impact on 
existing practices then we are in the realm of DEWEY's difference maxim—any 
dispute between proponents of the old theory and the new one is not of any 
practical concern; although they may prove to be important at a later stage. New 
theoretical insights, whether in the form of grand theories, conceptual models or 
some such, need to be judged in terms of the differences they make to people's 
practical understanding and actions—hence STRAUSS' continual interest in 
theories of action and interaction in social settings. [81]
3.7 Data, induction, and deduction
As has been stressed throughout the foregoing, it is crucial that researchers 
understand that they inevitably take an active role in the process of "data 
gathering"; this is not simply a matter of harvesting something that is naturally 
occurring. As STRÜBING (2007) argues, citing JAMES and MEAD, for 
Pragmatists reality is something that is always in the making, and data is 
something that social actors "carve out" from reality; an activity that is socially 
located, not simply an individual, isolated accomplishment. GLASER and 
STRAUSS' early work, and even their later, individual writings do not make this 
seeking to tie them together, each one became a central focus for a separate study and 
grounded theory—Awareness and Time. So the theory around each was then pitched at a 
higher level of abstraction than the concept. 
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clear in any manner: Continued use of the metaphor of emergence, or the 
passive voice that effaces the active researcher, are misleading (see Section 3.4 
above). This is not to imply that the Pragmatist argument can go by default, in a 
fashion similar to the more general claims about contructivism and interpretivism, 
these must be clearly stated and justified: but so too must any alternative or 
converse one of realism, positivism or post-positivism. This involves dealing with 
the issue of the active researcher, or perhaps to borrow GLASER's excellent 
point about gerunds, active researching. It also involves dealing with the issues of 
data, induction, deduction, and abduction. [82]
GTM has from the start been associated with induction; largely this was self-
professed by GLASER and STRAUSS as part of their reaction against the 
deductive approach prevalent in the 1960s. The GTM concept of induction is 
firmly wedded to that of data, and the grounding of any resulting conceptual 
models in that data as a result of an inductive process. The GTM context of 
induction manages to evade the usual problem of what is termed "the riddle of 
induction", since the resulting theory or set of concepts are substantive—i.e. they 
resonate with the context from which they have been derived, but do not make 
any wider claims as such. In this sense they have earned their way, but only up to 
a point. [83]
The riddle of induction is often exemplified in terms of swans (POPPER, 1961). 
Anyone observing swans in the Northern hemisphere until the 17th century would 
have noticed that they were all white; so there seemed no reason to doubt the 
validity of the statement that "all swans are white". It was only when Australia was 
explored by Europeans that people in the Northern hemisphere realised that 
black swans existed; hence the title of TALEB's recent book The Black Swan 
(2008), which deals with the inherently unpredictable. While it is understandable 
that GLASER and STRAUSS sought to distance their method from the deductive 
orthodoxy of the times, continuing to refer to GTM as an inductive method has 
come to be misleading, particularly for early-career researchers with only a limited 
understanding of terms such as induction and deduction. [84]
GLASER and STRAUSS' use of the term induction is best seen as idiosyncratic, 
and GLASER's continued use as distinctive and different from the issue as 
outlined in standard philosophy texts. This is bound up with his assumptions 
about data, which is still a major issue for GTM, as it is for many other subject 
areas, disciplines and methods. For GTM too many people take GLASER's 
slogan "All is data" (see Section 2.4) to mean that "Data is all". GLASER is 
correct to stress that GTM is first-and-foremost a method that starts from in-depth 
engagement with the research context, and this involves developing data, 
evidence, or whatever term is preferred. But this raises a number of issues that 
then need to be clarified, even if they cannot be easily resolved. [85]
Once the problematic issue of data is raised it is not possible simply to retreat 
behind the claim that "it's all there in the data". To an extent GTM avoids this with 
the concept of substantive theory, which makes a far more constrained 
knowledge claim; substantive grounded theories are theories about the 
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substantive context from which they have been drawn. They are the classic 
exemplars of theories of the middle range. But the data upon which they have 
been grounded can themselves be brought to account by others looking at the 
same context from a different perspective. STRAUSS' use of the term "slices of 
data" (1987, p.27) can be turned back on itself by wondering how the data could 
have been sliced in a different way; but STRAUSS himself fails to pose this. 
Instead for STRAUSS and CORBIN, as for GLASER, data is an unexamined, 
even immaculate concept. [86]
This is particularly perplexing with respect to STRAUSS given his detailed 
knowledge of DEWEY and MEAD; but there is an even more critical silence in his 
work with regard to the issues of induction and deduction. In QA STRAUSS did 
distance himself from sole reliance on induction, particularly from the rather 
vague form mentioned in Discovery and the other early GTM texts. He refers to 
verification in his initial outline of GTM, explicitly countering the charge that GTM 
is an inductive method; then expands on this by arguing that GMT starts out as 
inductive, but should then lead to the production of hypotheses that can 
subsequently be verified based on deductive inferences. He adds a footnote 
(1987, p.12) to the effect that PEIRCE also discussed the concept of abduction, 
but STRAUSS takes this no further. It is unfortunate that he offers nothing more 
detailed, since PEIRCE's concept of abduction seems to fit so well with the 
agenda of GTM—centring around novel insights leading to conceptual and 
theoretical innovations. [87]
3.8 Abduction and theoretical sensitivity 
It might be countered that PEIRCE's concept of abduction is merely another 
name for what GLASER terms "immaculate conceptualization" or POPPER's idea 
of "conjecture"; but it might just as easily be seen as related to the concept of 
theoretical sensitivity, which is so central to GTM that it is perhaps the pivotal 
point from which all forms of GTM develop. It is crucial to the early collaborative 
work of GLASER and STRAUSS, it is intimately associated with all GLASER's 
writing, and STRAUSS makes it the central point of QA—which is one of 
GLASER's key criticisms in his response to BQR. In the earlier sections I have 
argued that the repeated statements about GTM being an inductive method are 
highly misleading; not least because they rely on a largely unexamined, even 
ungrounded, characterisation of both induction and data. The corollary of this is 
that there is a far firmer basis for associating GTM with abduction, specifically 
through the concept of theoretical sensitivity. [88]
As we noted in the Handbook (BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007a) this latter term 
itself is elusive, but critical. Judging by their own writings and comments from 
their students and colleagues, both GLASER and STRAUSS possessed 
remarkable theoretical sensitivity—and GLASER continues to demonstrate this in 
his seminars. REICHERTZ (2007) argues that the term abduction combines the 
rational and the imaginative aspects of research, and this is precisely what 
theoretical sensitivity is meant to encompass. GLASER's characterisation of the 
term "theoretical sensitivity" (1978), as being "sensitive to theoretical issues while 
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scrutinizing the data", only goes so far; particularly since both the terms 
"theoretical issues" and "data" are ambiguous—and the former is itself the 
subject of the characterisation. GLASER could justifiably contend that the 
richness of the issue cannot be encapsulated in a single phrase, hence his entire 
book on the topic; one which should be compulsory reading for all researchers, 
not only those interested in using GTM. But this only reinforces the argument that 
the term is so important that it cannot be left floating free, linked only to an 
idiosyncratic and misleading concept of induction. [89]
REICHERTZ (2007) makes the point even more forcefully in discussing the 
necessity for understanding theoretical sensitivity as a form of abduction, since 
the result is to bring together the logic of discovery with the logic of justification 
within the context of methodological considerations. By so doing it alerts 
researchers to a key issue that should be central for all researchers, but perhaps 
applies most particularly to those undertaking qualitative research: Some aspects 
of research really do depend on the skills of the specific researcher; methods 
alone are necessary but not sufficient. Researching is not simply the case of 
collecting data or evidence, the researcher is a key factor in the research 
landscape, a link in the chain that reaches iteratively around data, codes, 
concepts and tentative theories. Again GLASER's gerund perspective (1996) 
needs stressing here; it is the activity of theorising that is crucial, and it is also 
crucial who is doing the theorising.20 [90]
CHARMAZ offers a definition of abduction as follows—
"a type of reasoning that begins by examining data and after scrutiny of these data, 
entertains all possible explanations for the observed data, and then forms hypotheses 
to confirm or disconfirm until the researcher arrives at the most plausible 
interpretation of the observed data" (2006, p.188). [91]
REICHERTZ offers another—
"Something unintelligible is discovered in the data, and on the basis of the mental 
design of a new rule, the rule is discovered or invented and, at the same time, it also 
becomes clear what the case is. The logical form of this operation is that of 
abduction. Here one has decided (with whatever degree of awareness and for 
whatever reasons) no longer to adhere to the conventional view of things" (2007, 
p.219). [92]
REICHERTZ notes that the term itself was first used by Julius PACIUS in the late 
16th century as a translation of ARISTOTLE's term apagoge, which referred to the 
third form of inference after induction and deduction. But it was PEIRCE who 
really brought it to people's attention in his work some 300 years later. PEIRCE 
was intent to argue that abduction was the only form of inference that actually 
extended knowledge, since both induction and deduction rely on developing 
existing knowledge. As REICHERTZ points out, PEIRCE changed his ideas on 
20 Interestingly BQR has an index entry for "theorizing"; QA does not; and most of GLASER's 
books have no index at all.
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the relationship between the three forms of inference in his writings, but he 
always saw abduction as a form of reasoning that develops from surprise or 
sudden flashes of insight. [93]
There seem to be at least two ways in which abduction operates in generating 
new knowledge. In the first instance it is very much like POPPER's idea of a 
conjecture, and in a fashion similar to POPPER (1992), PEIRCE argued that after 
such a guess or conjecture had been made, it should then be followed by 
generating and testing hypotheses. The second way, however, is the one that 
CHARMAZ and REICHERTZ characterise; in this case it is far more grounded 
and linked to data, observations, or other forms of evidence. To this extent it 
resonates with induction. Induction on its own, however, does not lead to new 
knowledge, but rather a reformulation of what is already known. As REICHERTZ 
points out, GTM is not simply inductive as this would merely lead to a re-casting 
of the data "on a more abstract level" (2007, p.223). The added aspect, which 
takes GTM into the abductive realm is theoretical sensitivity. [94]
In QA theoretical sensitivity is defined as "sensitivity to thinking about data in 
theoretical terms" (STRAUSS, 1987, p.21). Later on STRAUSS made the telling 
point that in order to develop theoretical sensitivity "wide reading in the literature 
in one's field and related disciplines is very useful, and probably a prerequisite" 
(STRAUSS, 1987, p.300). The later BQR has no mention of the term, but only for 
"sensitivity". As was mentioned earlier large sections of QA were taken verbatim 
from GLASER's book Theoretical Sensitivity (TS). GLASER himself in his critique 
of STRAUSS, particularly BQR, argues that STRAUSS ignores the essential 
meaning of both Discovery and TS. For GLASER theoretical sensitivity "refers to 
the researcher's knowledge, understanding, and skill, which foster his generation 
of categories and properties" (1992, p.27). [95]
As we pointed out in our introduction to the Handbook (BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 
2007a) the concept of theoretical sensitivity is central but paradoxical to GTM—
we discuss it as one of those aspects of the method that we describe as being 
seen as "simple yet skilful" (p.16). The paradox resides in the importance placed 
on such sensitivity, coupled with the difficulty in developing this skill. Theoretical 
sensitivity is critical to GTM, but describing theoretical sensitivity or explaining 
how one can develop this skill is not easy. Yet far too many GTM writers argue 
that the method is simple or straightforward, particularly when it comes to this 
aspect. Anyone who has taught and/or used GTM will know that this is not helpful; 
hence HESSE-BIBER notes that one of her students pointed out that one of the 
most difficult skills "is the ability to see what is in the data" (2007, p.330). [96]
Students and others who worked with STRAUSS remark on his powers of insight. 
Similarly STRAUSS himself was so impressed with GLASER's skills that he 
immediately engaged him. What may have come easily and naturally to this pair 
was what PEIRCE would have termed abductive reasoning; the ability to infer the 
best possible explanation from the data in whatever form it is presented. The 
contribution of GLASER and STRAUSS was not simply that they had these skills, 
but that they then managed to develop a detailed account and exemplars of what 
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was involved in this skill that would assist others to follow in their steps. But it is 
not something that is "simple and straightforward", although use of fundamental 
GTM aspects can greatly enhance a researcher's abilities in extending knowledge 
in PEIRCE's sense. [97]
In fact the dispute between GLASER and STRAUSS can be seen to emanate in 
part from precisely this issue. The early GTM works demonstrated the power of 
the method, but something more was required in terms of explaining the method 
to the research community and to budding research students. Discovery itself 
was more manifesto than methods manual (see Section 1.1), and the succinct 
Appendix to Time was far more useful in the early stages as a how-to guide to 
the method. In the late 1960s and early 1970s use of GTM spread mostly through 
the face-to-face teaching that STRAUSS and GLASER offered to the students on 
the doctoral program at UCSF; something we termed "Masters and Apprentices" 
(BRYANT & CHARMAZ, 2007a, p.4). But as news and use of the method spread, 
there was a clamour for a more detailed guide to GTM. Strauss claimed that he 
wrote QA precisely in response to this continuous demand from students. The 
later work, BQR, came about when readers pointed out that QA itself assumed 
too much knowledge of the method form the start. GLASER's attack on both 
books centred on the contrast between what he termed "emergence" versus 
"forcing" (1992); and perhaps it was inevitable that any effort to offer a step-by-
step guide to GTM would be open to this sort of criticism. But it can be argued 
that GLASER himself also offered similar guidelines to students of GTM in the 
form of his "Basic Social Processes" and "Theoretical Codes" (1978, chapters 4 & 
6). He stressed that these were only to be used at later stages of analysis, but 
then so too did STRAUSS and CORBIN with their coding paradigm. In his 
writings since the late 1990s, GLASER has made little or no mention of these 
factors, which perhaps indicates that he has had second thoughts on the matter. 
It may be that STRAUSS would have similarly sought to move on from BQR, 
although the 2nd edition was well under way even before he died. There is clearly 
a constant and incessant demand for a guide to GTM, hence the appearance of a 
3rd edition of BQR; in the library at my university there are 10+ copies of the book, 
and at least nine of these are on loan at any one time. [98]
Theoretical sensitivity is a core and critical aspect of GTM, and linking it to 
abduction helps to illuminate its characteristics and its role. It remains at the 
centre of attention for GLASER, although it appears to diminish in importance for 
STRAUSS and CORBIN. CHARMAZ provides an excellent discussion in her book 
(2006, pp.135-140), where she sees the terms as evoking something "playful" as 
opposed to a mechanical process of reasoning: again a clear link to abduction. [99]
Yet again it seems as if STRAUSS set his writings in GTM and his other works on 
parallel courses that never met. His stress on action and the thin red line of 
Pragmatism that runs through the non-GTM works are never brought to bear on 
his later GTM writings. He specifically, if briefly, addresses the issues of induction 
in BQR, but fails to develop the idea of abduction that seems so useful and 
applicable. [100]
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4. A Re-Invigoration of GTM through Pragmatism
What I have sought to offer is an explanation of the ways in which Pragmatism 
can resolve and clarify many of the key issues that have arisen from various 
critiques and developments of GTM. This builds on work that others have already 
started linking GTM with Pragmatism, providing the basis to re-state and highlight 
ways in which the method can be further articulated and applied. [101]
By adopting a Pragmatist perspective on GTM a number of problematic aspects 
of the method can be resolved; moreover the core strengths of the method come 
into clearer focus. First and foremost many of the issues separating the different 
writers on GTM can be cast aside. Thus whether researchers see themselves 
following GLASER, or STRAUSS (and CORBIN), or BRYANT and CHARMAZ, or 
any other variants, the key issue becomes the extent to which their substantive 
research produces conceptual innovations and theoretical insights that prove 
useful: this is to reiterate DEWEY's point about Instrumentalism. The 
epistemological issues that separate different strands, or branches of the GTM 
family, can then be set to one side provided that people's research writings do not 
seek to make strong epistemological claims; the ultimate criterion of good 
research should be that it makes a difference. [102]
This then reinforces the Pragmatist position that theories and concepts are best 
seen as tools; tools are assessed in terms of usefulness for particular tasks and 
applications. This can similarly be applied to methods, and GTM can then be 
assessed in terms of the concepts and theories that have been developed 
through use of the method; whichever version that has been adopted. [103]
Furthermore the Pragmatist position on truth also highlights the stress put on the 
development of concepts and theories by GTM. These outcomes are to be 
judged against the context from which they were developed, and can then be 
taken as working hypotheses or theories for potential extensibility to other 
settings. They can also be taken back to the initial context and used to inform 
practices, procedures and policies: Hence the strong tradition of GTM amongst 
practice-led disciplines. [104]
All of this taken together helps substantiate the way in which terms such as fit, 
grab, work, and modifiability, should be understood as part of the method, and 
can be applied to the method itself. All claims to knowledge must be seen as 
instrumental and provisional. Researchers can make claims for their own 
findings, but further developments and wider claims rely on a range of possible 
sources including further work by the researcher, additional research by others, 
and responses from those who were active in the initial research context itself. 
This last point is not explicit in all forms of GTM, but the constructivist form 
emphasises this unequivocally. This is also supported by the Pragmatist assertion 
that any attempt to provide clear demarcations between lay insight and expert 
knowledge will ultimately prove unsustainable. [105]
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One aspect in which the Pragmatist orientation might prove troublesome to some 
forms of GTM is the rejection of the spectator view of knowledge. For 
Pragmatists, developing ideas about the world is an activity which can never be 
completed, the focus is on knowing rather than knowledge. Thus researchers 
need to be aware of their own role and position in the activity of researching, and 
this brings in aspects such as positionality, orientation, diversity and reflexivity 
(see MRUCK & MEY, 2007 for an extended discussion). But those who refuse to 
entertain such issues in their work, or who claim that GTM can deal with all such 
perspectives without specifically addressing them as such, can also fall back 
upon the Pragmatist position that since all knowledge claims are provisional and 
open to doubt, so too are those which argue for specific inclusion of such issues. 
The only judgement to be made is with regard to the usefulness of the conceptual 
or theoretical outcome. [106]
In fact this positionality applies to GTM itself, as GLASER readily attests in 
Theoretical Sensitivity where he stresses that "Our perspective [i.e. GLASER and 
STRAUSS' GTM] is but a piece of a myriad of action in Sociology, not the only, 
right action" (1978, p.3). [107]
What is often missing, or implicit, in GTM writings is the context in which 
researchers operate. The early GTM work was carried out by GLASER, 
STRAUSS and QUINT, and later projects were carried out by STRAUSS and 
small teams of researchers (STRAUSS et al., 1985). Moreover research findings 
are reported in journals, conferences and so on. So there is always a community 
or audience for research at some stage. On the other hand researchers studying 
for a PhD are usually lone researchers, and so it is not surprising that much of 
the GTM literature appears aimed at this audience. But ultimately the reception 
and assessment of people's research goes on within a community, with an 
audience of peers as well as the ineluctable gatekeepers. It may also involve 
practitioners, research subjects and other participants. RORTY in typically 
provocative mood sums this up with the apothegm that "what counts as an 
accurate report of experience is a matter of what a community will let you get 
away with" (2007, p.11). These consensual and collegial aspects are all too often 
left implicit in GTM writings, but the Pragmatist stance helps correct this since it 
emanates precisely from a concern with knowledge as a continuous social 
activity. [108]
All of the above demonstrates that those who have already established the links 
between GTM and Pragmatism have opened up an important path for developing 
the method. If Pragmatism was a red thread running through STRAUSS' work, it 
became invisible in the context of his GTM writing. This was unfortunate since it 
meant that he was unable to articulate how the ideas of DEWEY, MEAD and 
others come to a new fruition in the method itself. The result was that STRAUSS' 
own version of GTM was left open to a wide range of criticisms, including 
GLASER's; many of them entirely justified. More critically it left the method itself 
open to a range of criticisms from which it has only recently begun to be 
extricated. A consideration of the strange case of ANSELM STRAUSS along the 
lines suggested should continue the work of those who have rediscovered the link 
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between the method and Pragmatism, re-evaluate the work of STRAUSS as a 
whole, and impel GTM forward as a rigorous, vigorous, and developing research 
tool. This paper is offered as a further step in that advance. [109]
As I explained in the opening section of this paper, I took the subtitle of this paper 
from a Sherlock Holmes story. In this concluding section I can again refer to 
Sherlock Holmes as a paradigm example of someone with supreme abductive 
skills and theoretical sensitivity—a grounded theorist before the discovery of 
grounded theory: a skill he shares with other real or fictional detectives, and also 
with people such as crash investigators, physicians, and others who have the 
ability to produce a diagnosis, often to the surprise of others, but which is based 
on a leap from the evidence or data to the inference of the best possible 
explanation. [110]
What GTM and Pragmatism have in common is a concern with people's 
engagement with the world, reliant on detailed observation and insight, followed 
by never-ending and iterative efforts to comprehend, persuade and enhance. To 
quote one of Oscar WILDE's aphorisms: "It is only shallow people who do not 
judge by appearances. The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the 
invisible".21 [111]
5. A Note on Pragmatism, Post-Modernism and Relativism
One of the key problems with constructivism is that it can easily end up as a full 
blown relativism or post-modernism. In such cases anyone proposing such a 
viewpoint is quickly seen to be in a paradoxical position. The claim that there is 
no objective ground for truth, and that all truth claims are contextually specific is 
itself a truth claim, and hence it is open to its own critique. RORTY offers a clear 
way out of this, specifically drawing on DEWEY and his contemporaries; but 
offering his own style of argument. RORTY's key concern is to counter all forms 
of foundationalism; i.e. all forms of argument that are premised on there being an 
ultimate foundation for knowledge claims—e.g. "the truth" or "objective reality". 
Those proposing post-modernism or relativism are correct to point to the 
weaknesses in the arguments of those who simply presume a foundation for 
knowledge claims, usually premised on the idea that truth is a reflection of reality 
or "a mirror of nature"; but they then fail to see their own foundations. 
Pragmatism avoids this, particularly in the work of RORTY, who credits DEWEY 
and his colleagues with a great deal, although it is RORTY himself who is 
responsible for articulating a coherent argument along these lines, steering away 
from relativism and the paradox of constructivism. In his critique of SEARLE, who 
desperately wishes to retain some form of "objective truth and validity" RORTY 
offers the following. 
"What we say is that you gain nothing for the pursuit of such truth by talking about 
mind dependence or mind independence of reality. All there is to talk about are the 
procedures we use for bringing about agreement among inquirers" (1998, p.72). [112]
21 http://thinkexist.com/quotation/it_is_only_shallow_people_who_do_not_judge_by/262237.html  
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Furthermore RORTY is adamant that attention to such procedures only has one 
objective—and it is worth giving the full quote. "Sociologists and psychologists 
might stop asking themselves whether they are following rigorous scientific 
procedures and start asking themselves whether they have any suggestions to 
make to their fellow citizens about how our lives, or our institutions, should be 
changed" (1998, p.70). In other words how do their suggestions add up in terms 
of civic fit and grab and earning their way; GTM already has this idea at its core. 
Recent developments around GTM are rediscovering this, and highlighting that 
the purpose of research is to perpetuate DEWEY's concept of knowledge as a 
conversation. Conversations do not reach an end point, but continue as the 
context demands and as new contexts and participants appear. STRAUSS 
makes this point early on in QA, and in general talks of theory as an ongoing 
process; GLASER similarly sees theorising as a perpetual activity, with 
knowledge claims being at best provisional: So here there is a clear consensual 
basis shared by the founders of the method itself. [113]
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